NOTES by unknown
Notes
DETERMINATION AND PAYMENT OF EQUITY RECEIVERSHIP COSTS
AFTER SUPERSEDING BANKRUPTCY
A BANKRUPTCY proceeding within four months of the appointment of an
equity receiver operates to give the bankruptcy court power to procure tho
assets of the bankrupt held by the receiver., However, it is not settled that
the bankruptcy court has power to prevent the receivership court from
determining the receivership costs 2 and, assuming a lack of this power, to
prevent the payment of these costs by the receivership court. In a recent
case 3 a receiver for an insolvent 'corporation was appointed by the Federal
District Court for the Southern District of California. Within four months
of the appointment of the receiver an involuntary petition in bankruptcy
was filed against the corporation in the same court sitting in bankruptcy.
Despite the opposition of the trustee the court, sitting in equity,4 accepted
the account and fixed the compensation of the receiver. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals for the 6th Circuit held that the District Court was without
jurisdiction to make such an order, and directions were given to consider the
application while sitting as a court of bankruptcy.
Early state decisions held that a state receiver should receive his compen-
sation before the assets were delivered to the trustee in bankruptcy. And
the Supreme Court by way of dictum in In Re Watts & Sachs 0 added
I In re Diamond's Estate, 259 Fed. 70 (C. C. A. 6th, 1919); In re Wil-
liams;,240 Fed. 788 (N. D. Ohio 1917). The most widely cited case is In
re Watts & Sachs, 190 U. S. 1, 23 Sup. Ct. 718 (1903) (involved an assignee
for the benefit of creditors). For cases denying the power where the peti-
tion was more than four months after the appointment of the receiver, see
Hoover v. Mortgage Co., 290 Fed. 891 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923) (federal receiver-
ship); Blair v. Brailey, 221 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 5th, 1915) (state receiver).
But cf. In re Weedman Stave Co., 199 Fed. 948 (E. D. Ark. 1912) (receiver
appointed under state insolvency statute declared void).
2 Including fees of the receiver and his counsel and receivership costs.
3 Moore v. Scott, 55 F. (2d) 863 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932).
4 In the order of adjudication the District Court reserved to itself as
an equity court the hearing of the accounts and the determination of the
fees of the receiver and his counsel. Adjudication did not follow the peti-
tion for almost two -years during which time the receiver continued to
administer the estate.
5 Mauran v. Crown Carpet Lining Co., 23 R. I. 344, 50 Atl. 387 (1901);
Wilson v. Parr, 115 Ga. 629, 42 S. E. 5 (1902). But cf. Hanson v. Stephens,
116 Ga. 722, 42 S. E. 1028 (1902). The Georgia cases are distinguished
on the grounds that in the former case there was cash available for pay-
ment of receivership costs while in the latter a sale of property was neces-
sary which was beyond the power of the receivership court. For a sugges-
tion that this distinction will be made in the federal courts see Hume v.
Myers, 242 Fed. 827, 830 (C. C. A. 4th, 1917).
6 Supra. note 1, at 35, 23 Sup. Ct. at 727. "It remains for the state court
to transfer the assets, settle the accounts of its receiver, and close its con-
nection with the matter."
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weight to these rulings by suggesting that although the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court was exclusive, nevertheless the state court should wind up
its receivership before turning over the assets to the trustee. This dictum
has been followed by a majority of state courts which have passed upon
the question.7 But in a dictum in Lion Bo?ding & Surety Co. v. Karatzs
Mr. Justice Brandeis expressed a contrary view and the citation of the
dictum of the Watts case in a note as "compare" may indicate that it has
been discountenanced. Moreover, a majority of federal decisions hold the
receiver accountable to the bankruptcy court.9 And where the receivership
court is allowed to fix the compensation of its receiver it is not permitted
to impress a lien upon the assets 10 and its decision is subject to review by
the bankruptcy court.'"
A summary order by the bankruptcy court requiring the receiver to turn
over the assets is available 12, but the better practice is for the trustee to
apply to the receivership court for an order directing the receiyer to deliver
the property.'2 In New Jersey, however, the courts have uniformly affirmed
the power of the receivership court to fix and pay the compensation of its
receiver and have refused to turn over the assets till payment has been
made.'I They have further indicated that an application by their receiver to
the bankruptcy court for compensation would be in contempt of the state
court 15 and have expressed their disapproval of a suggestion that a failure
to turn over all the assets to the trustee would put the receiver in contempt
of the federal court.' 6 In a recent case 17 the Federal District Court for
New Jersey, criticising the New Jersey decisions, held that the state court
was without jurisdiction to fx the compensation of its receivers. But the
New Jersey court has refused to follow this ruling until the Supreme Court
T 1st National Bank of Quincy v. Zangwell, 61 Fla. 596, 54 So. 375 (1911)
(power of state court not attacked but fees allowed) ; McGahee v. Cruick-
shank, 133 Ga. 649, 66 S. E. 776 (1909); Lambert v. National Hog Co.,
263 Pa. 354, 106 Atl. 541 (1919); cases cited infra note 14; see State v.
German Exchange Bank, 114 Wis. 436, 90 N. W. 570 (1902) (held a
matter of administrative discretion and the receiver advised to apply to
state court for determination of fees and federal court for payment, though
implied that claim would constitute lien). Contra: Bloch v. Bloch, 42 Misc.
278, 86 N. Y. Supp. 1047 (1903).
8 262 U. S. 640, 642, 43 Sup. Ct. 641, 642 (1923).
9 In re Diamond's Estate, supra note 1; In re Standard Fuller's Earth
Co., 186 Fed. 578 (S. D. Ala. 1911). Contra: Loveless v. Southern Grocer
Co., 159 Fed. 415 (C. C. A. 5th, 1908).
' In re Standard Fuller's Earth Co., supra note 9; In re Rogers, 116 Fed.
435 (S. D. Ga. 1902).
"-In re Moore, 42 F. (2d) 475 (N. D. Ga. 1930) ; Hume '%. Myers, supra
note 5.
12 In re Moore, mpra note 11; Gamble v. Daniel, 39 F. (2d) 447 (C. C. A.
8th, 1930).
.
3 In re Williams, supra note 1; In re Lingert Wagon Co., 110 Fed. 927
(S. D. N. Y. 1901).
'4 Perfection Garment Co. v. Crosly Stores Inc., 109 N. J. Eq. 450, 158
Atl. 380 (1932); Singer v. National Bedstead Mfg. Co., 65 N. J. Eq. 290,
25 Atl. 868 (1903).
15 Colton v. Bankshares Corp. of United States, 108 N. J. Eq. 417, 418, 155
Atl. 471 (1931).
16 Id. at 418, 155 Atl. at 471, cited with approval in Moore Co. v. Federal
Metal Bed Co., 159 Atl. 698 (N. J. Ch. 1932).
'it Silberberg v. Ray Chain Stores Inc., 54 F. (2d) 650 (D. N. J. 1931).
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has passed upon the question.s In this situation only an appeal to that
court can determine the conflict, although the Lion Bonding case makes it
likely that the federal court will be upheld.
As a matter of administration the equity court would seem better qualified
to pass on the costs of its own receivership, and comity would suggest that
it should be allowed to do so even though its decision be subject to review
by the bankruptcy court. The more important aspect of the conflict, and the
only one where the same judge presides in both courts, is a possible differ-
ence in the preferential treatment accorded receivership claims. While in
the receivership court receivership costs would be preferred to other classes
of creditors,'0 it is possible that they will only be preferred in the bank-
ruptcy court to the extent to which they were of benefit in preserving the
estate.20 In In TO Quemahoning Creek Coal Co.21 the court indicated that
receivership costs should be preferred to mortgage creditors, but in that
case it was found that the mortgage holders had consented to the receiver-
ship and so could not complain of the preference granted the receiver. In
an earlier case 22 it was held that the receivership costs should be prior to
administration costs and taxes, but it was assumed that the receivership
was necessary for the preservation of the estate. On the other hand, the fees
of an attorney opposing the bankruptcy proceedings have not been allowed.23
because of no benefit to the estate. And in one case the receiver was limited
to compensation for services which were performed after the petition,24 the
suggestion being made that the receiver should sue the plaintiff in the state
action to recover compensation for the period prior to the filing of the
petition. These decisions bear on the problem, but because of distinguishing
facts afford no sound basis for an accurate prediction as to the priority to
be granted all receivership costs by bankruptcy courts.25
If receivership costs are not granted priority, particularly as in the In-
stant case where the receivership extended over a considerable period of
time, injustice will be done to the receiver who gave his services on the
strength of the authority of the receivership court at the time of his ap-
pointment. Again, if it were probable that bankruptcy within four months
would avoid the preferences granted under the receivership, difficulty would
18Perfection Garment Co. v. Crosly Stores Inc., supra note 14.
19 Kennebec Box Co., Inc. v. 0. S. Richards Corp., 5 F. (2d) 951 (C. C. A.
2d, 1925); Cambell v. Nichols, 145 Wash. 614, 261 Pac. 408 (1927). See
MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 8013; IOWA CODE (1927) § 12719. Cf. Nmw
YORK LAWS (1929) c. 650, §§ 180, 181.
20 Receivership expenses are granted as a priority when they are In-
curred as a necessary step in the preservation of the estate. In re Chase,
124 Fed. 753 (C. C. A. 1st, 1903) (an assignee for the benefit of creditors
under a state statute) ; see Rand Randolph v. Seruggs, 190 'U. S. 533, 539,
23 Sup. Ct. 710, 712, 713; In re Rogers v. Stefani, 156 Fed. 267, 269
(W. D. Ark. 1907). See BANKRUPTCY ACT, § 64 b (1). This section does
not make a provision for services rendered before filing of the petition and
no authority is given in the act for such a priority. See also In re Board
of Directors of Suburban Construction Co., 143 N. Y. Supp. 363 (Sup. Ct.
19.13) (attorney who procured receivership treated as unsecured creditor,
but receiver granted a priority).
2115 F. (2d) 58 (W. D. Pa. 1926).
22 Pain v. Arch, 233 Fed. 259 (C. C. A. 9th, 1916).
23 In re Zier & Co., 127 Fed. 399 (D. Ind. 1904), aff'd, 142 Fed. 102 (C.
C. A. 7th, 1905).24 In re J. H. Alison Lumber Co., 137 Fed. 643, 647 (S. D. Ga. 1905).
25 See also In re Rogers, 116 Fed. 435, 437 (S. D. Ga. 1902); In re
Lengert Wagon Co., 110 Fed. 927, 928 (S. D. N. Y. 1901).
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be encountered in obtaining the necessary credit to carry on a business in
receivership. Receivership certificates and materialmen's claims would be
at a discount till the four months' period was safely past. Only if priority
be given receivers' costs by the bankruptcy court, can the effect of the hold-
ing in the principal case be limited to delay and added expense.
TAXATION OF FEDERAL AtND STATE INSTRUmENTALITIES
WITHIN the past year the Supreme Court has shown a decided change in
attitude toward the doctrine that neither the state nor the federal govern-
ment may tax the instrumentalities of the other.' Traditionally, it was said
that the principle rested upon an "entire absence of power,"2 and the ex-
emption, absolute in its application,3 was extended to corporate and indi-
vidual income even remotely related to such functions. Thus in Pandandc
Oil Co. v. Knox,4 a state excise tax was held unconstitutional so far as it
affected sales made by a private company to the Coast Guard Fleet. In
Gillespie v. Oklahomas oil obtained by a private lessee of lands granted by
the government to the Indians, was declared not to be subject to a non-
discriminatory state tax on minerals. And in Long v. Rockiood o it was held"
that royalties from licenses under federal patents could not be included in
the computation of net income for the purposes of a state franchise tax.
Four cases in the last year have demonstrated a complete departure from
these decisions.i In Willcuts v. Bunn,8 the federal income tax was declared
properly applicable to profits gained by an individual from the sale of state
bonds. In Susquehanna Power Co. v. State Tax Commission,0 submerged
land owned by a corporation building a dam in which the federal govern-
ment had an interest, was held subject to state land taxes. In Group No. 1
'IMcCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819); Ambrosini v. United
States, 187 U. S. 1, 23 Sup. Ct. 1 (1902).
For a history and critique of the doctrine, see: Powell, Indirect Encroacli-
ment on Federal Autlrity (1918) 31 HARv. L. REV. 321; Powell, The
Macallen Case-and Before (1930) 8 NAT. INc. TAX MAG. 47; and Powell,
An Imaginary Judicial Opinion (1931) 44 HARv. L. REV. 889.
2 Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U. S. 51, 55, 41 Sup. Ct. 16 (1920).
3 Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501, 505, 42 Sup. Ct. 171, 172 (1921).
4 277 U. S. 218, 48 Sup. Ct. 451 (1928).
z; Supra note 3. See also: Choctaw, Oklahoma & Gulf Ry. Co. v. Harrison,
235 U. S. 292, 35 Sup. C-. 27 (1914) ; Indian Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U. S.
522, 36 Sup. Ct. 453 (1916); Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U. S. 609, 46
Sup. Ct. 592 (1926).
G 277 U. S. 142, 48 Sup. Ct. 463 (1928).
7 Discussion of Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U. S. 379, 51 Sup.
Ct. 170 (1931) and Pacific Co. v. Johnson, 52 Sup. Ct. 424 (U. S. 1932) is
omitted, because the acts there involved were sustained mainly upon the
basis of the "subject" test, whereby franchise taxes are declared invalid
if, in their operation, they affect federal instrumentalities, Macallen v.
Massachusetts, 279 U. S. 620, 49 Sup. Ct. 432 (1929); Miller v. Milwaukee,
272 U. S. 713, 47 Sup. Ct. 280 (1927); and valid if tax exempt sources are
used only as the "measure" of the value of the license. Home Insurance Co.
v. New York, 134 U. S. 594, 10 Sup. Ct. 593 (1890) ; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,
220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342 (1911). See: Isaacs, The Subject and Meas-
ure of Taxation (1926) 26 CoL. L. REV. 939; (1931) 44 HARV. L. REv. 829;
and (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 826.
8 282 U. S. 216, 51 Sup. Ct. 125 (1931).
9 283 U. S. 291, 51 Sup. Ct. 434 (1931).
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land owned by a corporation building a dam in which the federal govern.
ment had an interest, was held subject to state land taxes. In Group No. I
Oil Company v. Bass,o the federal income tax was sustained in so far as
it affected income from gas and oil obtained by the lessee of lands granted
by a state to its University. And most recently, in Fox Film Corporation V.
Doyal," royalties received by the petitioner from the licensing of copy-
righted motion picture films were refused exemption from a state tax 12
measured by gross receipts. In the Fox Film case, the court pointed out that
the sole interest of the government in copyrights was the securing of a
monopoly to the holder, and that a tax on the royalties could not possibly
interfere with the protection thus afforded. Hence, the mere fact that a
copyright was property derived from a grant by the United States was
declared insufficient to support the claim of exemption. Inasmuch as the
conclusion reached was said to apply with equal force to patents, Long
v. Rockwood was definitely overruled.13
The point of view expressed by the court in these cases is persuasive,
"In a broad sense, the taxing power of either government, even when exer-
cised in a manner admittedly necessary and proper, unavoidably has some
effect upon the other." 14 But, "the power to tax is no less essential than
(for example) the power to borrow money." 15 Therefore, "the exemption
of an instrumentality of one government from taxation by the other must
be given such a practical construction as will not unduly impair the taxing
power of the one or the appropriate exercise of its functions by the other." 1o
This method of approach is diametrically opposed to the traditional view
that the question is "one of power and not of practical results." 11 How-
ever, it would be too much to expect that the venerable premises of former
opinions should have been abandoned altogether. Indeed, twice within the
past year, the court has rested decisions directly upon them. i s The Fox Fim
case is the first in which the Court has specifically overruled a prior decision
on this question.19 And even here Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, in an extremely
10 283 U. S. 279, 51 Sup. Ct. 432 (1931).
11 U. S. Daily, May 18, 1932, at 524.
12 GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1930) § 993 (316)-(341). Because the
measure of the tax was gross receipts instead of net income, the court felt
bound to declare that the tax was imposed directly upon the royalties. Cf.
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Wisconsin, 275 U. S. 136, 141,
48 Sup. Ct. 55, 56 (1927); Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U. S.
292, 297, 38 Sup. Ct. 126, 128 (1917); United States Glue Co, v. Oak
Creek, 247 U. S. 321, 328, 38 Sup. Ct. 499, 501 (1918). Educational Films
v. Ward, supra note 7, was said not to be controlling, because there the tax
was measured by net income.
13 Supra note 11, at 525.
14 Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 523, 46 Sup. Ct. 172, 174
(1926).
1- Willcuts v. Bunn, supra note 8 at 225, 51 Sup. Ct. at 127.
1G Susquehanna Power Co. v. State Tax Commission, supra note 9, at 294,
51 Sup. Ct. at 435.
17 Commonwealth v. Westinghouse Manufacturing Co., 151 Pa. 265, 270,
24 Atl. 1107, 1109 (1892).
Is Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 570, 51 Sup. Ct. 601
(1931) was held to be ruled by the Panhandle case, supra note 4, and Burnet
v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 52 Sup. Ct. 443 (U. S. 1932) by the Gillespie
case, supra note 3.
19 Willcuts v. Bunn, supra note 8, Susquehanna Power Co. v. State Tax
Commission, supra note 9, and Group No. 1 Oil Corp. v. Bass, supra note
10, managed to distinguish conflicting opinions.
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cautious opinion, narrowed the issue to a point where only Long 1. Roc:-
wood had to be discarded.20
The present tendency of the court, therefore, has not yet been carried to
its logical conclusions. Nevertheless, the decision in the Fox Film case is at
least economically sound. For the rising cost of state and local government,
enhanced by widespread unemployment, and accompanied by a decrease in
the traditional sources of revenue, indicates that new fields for taxation
must be found. Moreover, there is now ground for the hope that in the
future all income claiming exemption as a federal instrumentality, perhaps
even the thirty billion dollars invested in tax exempt securities,2 will have
to prove by facts as to actual consequences, instead of leaving the decision
to the inadequate guidance of judicial notice,22 that their inclusion in a
state or federal tax would cast any appreciable burden on either govern-
ment's borrowing power.
The way to the final step in this direction was suggested by Mr. Justice
Brandeis in his separate opinion in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.- He
pointed out that the validity of a given tax depends not upon a proposition
of law, but wholly upon the determination of the fact whether, in the par-
ticular instance, an objectionable burden is imposed upon the execution of a
governmental function-and questions of fact need not be fettered by stare
deeisig.24
RELEASE OF LESSEE BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN LEssoR AND ASSIGNEE oF LEASE
TnE Winchester Repeating Arms Co., lessee, transferred its entire interest
in the term to the Bayshore Co., which paid the rent direct to the lessor,
the latter consenting to the transfer. Thereafter, the Winchester Co. passed
into receivership. On notification by the receivers that they "canceled the
lease and renounced all further liability of the Winchester Co. thereto,"
the tenant Bayshore Co., considering itself released, paid the rent to date
and vacated. The lessor, having notified all parties that it would take pos-
session of the premises without releasing them from liability, executed a
new lease to the Bayshore Co. for the remainder of the term at reduced
rental. Thus far, all parties had assumed that the Bayshore Co. originally
held as sublessee. But in the receivership proceedings, the transfer was
2oThe problem was stated thus: "Where the immunity exists, it is ab-
solute, resting upon 'an entire absence of power,' Johnson v. Maryland, 254
U. S. 51, 55, 56, but it does not exist 'where no direct burden is laid upon
the governmental instrumentality, and there is only a remote, if any, influ-
ence upon the exercise of the functions of government. Willeuts v. Bunn,
282 U. S. 216, 225." Supra note 11. Obviously the exception swallows the
rule. But the dictum did provide a way to distinguish the Gillespie case and
the Coronado case.
21 Seligman, Toward a New Tax Program (1932) 134 Tim NATO 484,
486.2 2 Willeuts v. Bunn, supra note 8, at 230, 51 Sup. Ct. at 129.
23 Supra note 18.
24,,The decision of the court, if, in essence, merely the determination of
a fact, is not entitled, in later controversies between other parties, to that
sanction which, under the policy of stare decilsis, is accorded to decisions
of a proposition purely of law. For not only may the decision of the fact
have been rendered upon an inadequate presentation of the existing con-
ditions, but the conditions may have changed meanwhile . . ."' Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., supra note 18, at 449.
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held to have been an assignment 1 resulting in the assignor's becoming
surety for payment of the rent by the assignee.2 The court deduced there-
from that the new agreement, not containing any reservation of rights
against the surety, constituted a release rendering void the lessor's claim
for damages in the receivership..
The stated basis for this result is that the creditor made a "wholly now
contract with the principal" 4 which discharged the surety. But implicit in
this suretyship rule is the assumption that the new agreement constituted
a contract. Thus an agreement invalid for want of consideration will not
release the surety.5 And it is settled law of landlord and tenant that the
mere promise of the lessor to reduce the rent is nudurn pactum.0 The sec-
ond lease of the instant case apparently amounted to no more. The lessee
Bayshore Co. merely promised to perform its preexisting obligations in
return for a reduction of over seven thousand dollars yearly rental. Nor
should the inclusion of new covenants by the lessee in the second lease
suffice to validate it in a court of equity, inasmuch as they were obviously
not regarded as the equivalent of the substantial reduction in rent. More-
over, the rationale of the maxim strictissime jure as applied to a gratuitous
surety is entirely lacking in the case of an assignor of a lease, since the
fact of his becoming a surety is but an incident of the self-serving act of
assignment If, therefore, the lessee was not discharged on the original
lease, the Winchester Co.'s right of subrogation as surety remained unim-
paired.
The court further refused to consider as a basis for allowance of the
claim, the repudiation of the suretyship obligation by the receivers, which
antedated the vacating by the Bayshore Co. Although recognizing the doc-
trine of anticipatory breach as giving a provable claim in receivership, the
court excluded from its application a repudiation by the surety. But such a
distinction seems unwarranted, especially in view of the recent case of
Maynard v. Elliott 9 in which the Supreme Court allowed such a claim in
bankruptcy. And the restrictions on proof of claims reasonably should not
be more severe in receivership than in bankruptcy. If then, the Winchester
Co.'s obligations on the lease had become a liability to damages, it is argu-
able that the subsequent alleged release of the principal was without effect.
I A transfer, as in this case, which leaves no reversion in the original
lessee, results in an assignment. 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (1920) 170.
2 Collins v. Pratt, 181 Mass. 345, 63 N. E. 946 (1902); Realty and Re-
building Co. v. Rea, 45 Cal. App. 673, 188 Pac. 621 (1920).
3 T. A. D. Jones Co. v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 55 F. (2d) 944
(D. Conn. 1932). The facts stated herein are simplified.
4Supra note 3, at 948.
5 Vanderbeck v. Tierney-Connolly Construction Co., 77 N. J. L. 664, '3
Atl. 480 (1909) ; Dodd v. Vucovich, 38 Mont. 188, 99 Pac. 296 (1909) ; Dodge
v. Chapman, 42 Cal. App. 612, 183 Pac. 966 (1919). That the statutes in the
two preceding cases are merely codifications of the common law see U. S.
Building & Loan Ass'n v. Burns, 4 Pac. (2d) 703 (Mont. 1931).
6 1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1910), 1055 et sq.
7 In view of the lessor's written statement of intention to hold all parties
liable on the original lease, the court seems clearly in error in holding that
a surrender of the original lease took place. Miller v. Benton, 55 Conn. 529,
13 Atl. 678 (1887), Higgins v. Street, 19 Okla. 42, 92 Pac. 153 (1907);
Note (1908) 13 L. R. A. [N. S.] 398.
8 In this respect, the assignor of a lease as a surety seems analogous to a
corporate, or "compensated," surety for which see ARNOLD, SURETYSHIP AND
GUARANTY (1927), 359 et seq.
9 283 U. S. 273, 51 Sup. Ct. 390 (1931).
1240 [Vol. 41
The only substantial remaining objection to allowance of the lessor's claim
in receivership is a ground advanced by the court that, in executing the new
lease, the lessor had not mitigated, but increased the damages. While the
court states that the lessor had only to sue the Bayshore Co. for breach of
the original lease, it.seems clear that such action was not compulsory, inas-
much as the creditor lessor had the option of proceeding against either the
assignor or assignee.1o And since a lease to a third party would clearly
be regarded as in mitigation of damages, it seems that a lease to the same
tenant is no worse if the obligation, and right of subrogation relating to
the original lease, remain intact.", In forcing the lessor to rent to a third
party or allow the premises to remain vacant, the rule in the instant case
imposes considerable hardship, especially since, in a period of falling prices,
the lessor will frequently be unable to rent over to a third party premises
which are suited to a particular purpose.
INJUNCTION AGAINST PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT IN
ABSENCE or PARTY THERETO
H'usting Company v. Coca-Cola Company I is illustrative of the possibil-
ity of complications attendant upon the rendition of an equitable decree
in the absence of an indispensable party. In 1917 the X corporation,
proprietor of the exclusive right to bottle and sell "Coca-Cola" in Wisconsin,
assigned to the A corporation, the exclusive bottling rights within Y county,
A promising to purchase an annual minimum of Coca-Cola syrup, and X
reserving a power to terminate the gontract upon breach of A's promise.
A's orders having fallen below the minimum in 1920, X attempted to exer-
cise its power to terminate by refusing further shipments to A. A declared
that its failure to perform was excused by X's requests to curtail orders
during a sugar shortage. In 1923 independent promoters, with kmowledge
of A's contention, organized the B corporation, which contracted with
X for exclusive rights within certain counties in Wisconsin, including Y
county. Subsequently B assigned part of its rights to its subsidiary, the C
corporation, which began operation within Y county. In an action insti-
tuted by A to enjoin B and C from inducing a breach of A's contract with
X, B and C filed a plea in abatement alleging that X, a foreign corporation
which could not be served and had not voluntarily appeared, was an in-
dispensable party. But the Wisconsin court, conceding that the action
necessarily involved a material question concerning X's rights, neverthe-
less held that this fact afforded no valid objection to proceeding to a decree
against B and C, since they, as alleged tort-feasors, were in no position to
complain that another joint tort-feasor had not been joined with them.
In a subsequent trial on the merits, A in X's absence successfully demon-
strated that X, by requesting A to curtail orders, had lost the power to
terminate its contract with A, and that B and C, by procuring the assign-
ment of bottling rights within A's territory, had induced a breach of X's
contract with A. Therefore the court perpetually enjoined B and C from
further operations within Y county 2
The immediate effect of this injunction is to compel B to breach its con-
tract with X, in so far as that contract requires B to purchase syrup and
10 In re Tidus, 4 F. (2d) 558 (D. Del. 1925).
17 If the surety's right to subrogation remains intact, the basic reason for
release because of a "new contract" between creditor and debtor is avoided.
1194 Wis. 311, 216 N. W. 833 (1927).
2 237 N. W. 85 (Wis. 1931).
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bottle Coca-Cola within Y county. It is therefore quite possible that X,
not being a party to the action, and not being bound by the decree, might
institute a subsequent action for damages against B for B's failure to per-
form its contract, under the contention that the contract between X and A
was lawfully, terminated. Should X succeed in its contention, as is not in-
conceivable in view of the close contest over the issues in the principal
case,3 the question would be presented whether B's duty to pay damages
to X would be discharged by reason of the Wisconsin injunction. There
is respectable authority 4 for the view that impossibility of performance
may be caused by a supervening judicial decree, provided that such decree
is not induced by the promisor's "contributing fault." "Contributing fault"
has in some cases been thought to imply a failure of diligence in procuring
a dissolution of the injunction,5 and might well be extended to include a
failure of diligence in notifying the promisee of the pendency of the third
party's action against the promisor. It is apparent in the principal case,
however, that B's efforts to procure a dissolution of the injunction could
not have been more assiduous in view of its motion for rehearinge and
petition to the United States Supreme Court for certiorari; ? and it is
reasonable to presume that X was notified of the pendency of the action
against B and C inasmuch as its officers were present as witnesses at the
trial court. The consequent denial of X's right to damages against B
would indicate the binding effect of the Wisconsin injunction upon X, even
though entered in its absence. This prejudice to X would seem the very
evil at which the rule as to the indispensability of parties has bcen aimed 8
3 Additional issues were litigated concerning the relations between A
and X: the sufficiency of X's notice of termination of the contract, the
adequacy of A's remedy at law, the effect of A's failure to institute an
action against X, and of its violation of its covenant not to manufacture or
sell imitations of Coca-Cola. It is conceivable that X's evidence on these
issues might justify the conclusion that the contract between A and X was
lawfully terminated.
4RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (Am. L. Inst. 1932) c. 14,
§ 458; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1939. For the appointment of a
receiver as impossibility of performance, see Note (1919) 3 A. L. R. 627.
5 Peckham v. Industrial Securities Company, 31 Del. 200, 113 Atl. 799
(1921); see Union Contracting & Paving Company v. Campbell, 2 Cal.
App. 534, 536, 84 Pac. 305 (1905).
6 Denied, 238 N. W. 626 (Oct. 29, 1931).
" Denied, 52 Sup. Ct. 311 (Feb. 23, 1932). Defendants argued that the
Wisconsin court's adjudication of X's rights in its absence, and indirect
nullification of the contract between X and B by means of the Wisconsin
injunction, was a taking of property without due process of law. Such
an argument, however, would seem a mere restatement in constitutional
terms of the contention that X was an indispensable party. Denial of the
petition was in accord with numerous dicta to the effect that the due process
clause does not enable the United States Supreme Court to revise the
decisions of state courts on questions of state law, even though they may
be contrary to previous decisions. See American Ry. Express Company v.
Commonwealth of Kentucky, 273 U. S. 269, 273, 47 Sup. Ct. 353, 354,
(1927); Chicago Life Insurance Company v. Cherry, 244 U. S. 25, 30, 37
Sup. Ct. 492, 493 (1917); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 461, 27
Sup. Ct. 556, 557 (1907).
s For the technical distinction between "necessary" and "indispensable"
parties, see Mallow v. Hinde, 12 Wheat. 193, 197 (1827); Shields v. Barrow,
17 How. 130, 139 (1855) ; Williams v. Bankhead, 19 Wall. 563, 571 (1873) ;
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in cases involving the validity of charters,% the disposition of a common
fund,o or the reformation,". rescission,.2- or the setting aside of instru-
ments,la -where there have been outstanding claims of third parties whose
joinder is impossible.
However, older cases intimate that a supervening injunction does not
excuse the promisor's performance, on the theory either that the promisor
should have contracted against the contingency, 4 or that his performance
is not sufficiently "illegalized," 1 as in the case of a supervening prohibi-
tive governmental act. The application of this reasoning to dispose of a
subsequent action between X and B, therefore, would subject B not only
to the Wisconsin injunction preventing performance, but also to an action
for damages at the hands of X for failure to perform. Thus to expose B
to the double liability of conflicting judgments would seem inconsistent
with the policy of equity to leave no one exempt from a decree who can
later bring forth an inconsistent claim against one of the parties to the
original proceedings.'e
It may well be, however, that the possibility of complications resulting
from the absence of X as a party to the proceedings in 1927 is somewhat
hypothetical in view of the apparent cooperation between X, B and C
in presenting evidence to the trial court in 1928.17 But it is difficult to
assume that the court in 1927 could have foreseen such conduct in the
1928 trial. In any event, the decision in the principal case, while it may
not entail undesirable consequences in view of the particular circumstances,
CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 245; CLEPHANTE, EQUITY PLEADING (1928)
3148.
9 Northern Indiana R. R. Co. v. Michigan Central R. R. Co., 15 How.
233 (1853); California v. Southern Pacific Company, 157 U. S. 229, 15
Sup. Ct. B91 (1895).
-Russell v. Clark's Executors, 7 Cranch 69 (U. S. 1812); Williams v.
Bankhead, supra note 8; Mahr v. Norwich Union Fire Insurance Company,
127 N. Y. 452, 28 N. E. 391 (1891).
33 Steinbach v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 172 N. Y.
471, 65 N. E. 281 (1902); see Eustis Manufacturing Company v. Saco
Brick Company, 198 Mass. 212, 220, 84 N. E. 449, 452 (1908).
12 Shields v. Barrow, supra note 8.
"3 Leases. South Penn Oil Company v. Miller, 175 Fed. 729 (C. C. A. 4th,
1909); Columbia Water Power Company v. Columbia Electric Street Ry.
Light & Power Company, 43 S. C. 154, 20 S. E. 1002 (1895). Confracts.
Leydon v. Owen, 150 Mo. App. 102, 129 S. W. 984 (1910); see Osterhoudt
v. Board of Supervisors, 98 N. Y. 239, 244 (1885). Wills. Carrau v.
O'Calligan, 125 Fed. 657 (C. C. A. 9th, 1903), affd, 199 U. S. 89, 25 Sup.
Ct. 727 (1905) sub. nonz Farrel v. O'Brien. Judicial Sales. See Hoe v.
Wilson, 9 Wall. 501, 503 (1869). Assignmcnts for benefit of crcditors.
First National Bank of Amsterdam v. Shuler, 153 N. Y. 163, 47 N. E. 262
(1897).
- Doolittle v. Nash, 48 Vt. 441 (1876) ; McQuiddy v. Brannock, 70 Mo.
App. 535 (1897).
isWhittemore v. Sills, 76 Mo. App. 248 (1898); see Klauber v. San
Diego Street Car Company, 95 Cal. 353, 357, 30 Pac. 555, 555 (1892).
16 The following cases were apparently influenced by a fear of a double
recovery against the defendant before the court. California v. Southern
Pacific Company, supra note 9; Mahr v. Norwich Union Fire Insurance
Company, supra note 10; Steinbach v. Prudential Insurance Company of
America, supra note 11; Leydon v. Owen, supra not 13. But cf. Note (1911)
29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 405.
17 See appellant's brief in opposition to motion for rehearing, at 11 et zeq.
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is representative of some of the dangers that may flow from ignoring the
prejudice to an absent party and the defendant before the court in a desiro
to avoid a total denial of a complainant's equitable relief.'8
SET-OFF OF CROSS-JUDGMENT AGAINST ASSIGNED JUDGM ENT
DEFENDANT had recovered judgment against the plaintiff. Subsequently the
plaintiff obtained a judgment against the defendant. Plaintiff now seeks to
enjoin defendant's levying execution and to set off her judgment against the
defendant's. Prior to plaintiff's recovery of her cross-judgment, defendant's
judgment had been assigned, and made subject to attorney's lien, and to
protect their respective interests, the assignees and attorneys 1 intervened.
The defendant was found to be insolvent, but when he became so is not
indicated. The Georgia Supreme Court granted the injunction and set-off.2
This decision extends the doctrine of set-off of mutual judgments beyond
the limits of its application in other jurisdictions and establishes a rule
which tends to destroy the marketability of judgments.
Where a cross-judgment is held by the judgment debtor at the time of
the assignment, the assignee ordinarily takes subject to a right of set-off
on the part of the judgment debtor.3 In some cases the right to set-off
is based primarily on the fact that the assignee knew of the cross-
judgment 4 and is denied if he did notS or could not know 0 of it. But the
usual attitude of the courts is that the element of notice is of no signifi-
cance and that assignment of the judgment carries the burden of any existing
cross-judgmentV The rule is the same as that commonly applied to other
choses in action.8 Where, on the other hand, the cross-judgment is recov-
ered after the assignment, there obviously can be no burden existing at
18 Under analogous circumstancesa result similar to that in the principal
case has been reached. New York Phonograph Company v. Jones, 123 Fed.
197 (S. D. N. Y. 1903); Alcazar Amusement Company v. Mudd & Colley
Amusement Company, 204 Ala. 509, 86 So. 209 (1920); Nokol Company
v. Becker, 318 Mo. 292, 300 S. W. 1108 (1927). But see New York Bank
Note Company v. Hamilton Bank Note Engraving & Printing Company, 83
'Hun 593, 598, 31 N. Y. Supp. 1060, 1064 (Sup. Ct. 1st Dep't 1895). of.
Montgomery Enterprises v. Empire Theatre Company, 204 Ala. 566, 86
So. 880 (1920); Note (1930) 69 A. L. R. 1038.
'Under the Georgia decisions attorneys with lien are treated as bona
fide assignees. Caudle v. Rice, 78 Ga. 81 (1886).
2 Odom v. Attaway, 173 Ga. 883, 162 S. E. 279 (1931). Accord: Langston
v. Roby, 68 Ga. 406 (1882); Smith v. Evans, 110 Ga. 536, 35 S. E. 633
(1900).
3 Brown v. Hendrickson, 39 N. J. L. 239 (1877); Filbert v. Hawk, 8
Watts 443 (Pa. 1839) ; cf. McBride v. Fallen, 65 Cal. 301, 4 Pac. 17 (1884).
4 Skinker v. Smith, 48 Mo. App. 91 (1892); Wabash Railroad Co. v.
Bowring, 103 Mo. App. 158, 77 S. W. 106 (1903); Nuzum v. Morris, 25
W. Va. 559 (1885).
5 Ames v. Bates, 119 Mass. 397 (1876); Mervine v. Greble, 2 Pars. Eq.
271 (Pa. 1849); Davidson v. Lee, 162 S. W. 414 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
6 Simmons v. Reid, 31 S. C. 389, 9 S. E. 1058 (1889); Heston v. Finley,
118 Kan. 717, 236 Pac. 841 (1925).
7 Brown & Bro. v. Lapp, 89 S. V. 304 (Ky. 1905); Rowe v. Langley,
49 N. H. 395 (1870); Chamberlin v. Day, 3 Cow. 353 (N. Y. 1824); see
Graves v. Woodbury, 4 Hill 559, 561 (N. Y. 1843).
8 DeLaval Separator Co. v. Sharpless, 134 Iowa 28, 111 N. W. 438 (1907);
Brown & Bro. v. Lapp, supra note 7.
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the time of the assignment which can attach as a set-off. In certain situa-
tions, however, courts have permitted the set-off of subsequently obtain2d
cross-judgments.0 This result is uniformly reached both where the assign-
ment was made fraudulently in order to defeat a possible later set-offy0
and where the assignor was insolvent at the time of the assignment. 1
And while there is a good deal of authority to the contrary, some courts
have permitted set-offs in cases where the claim which later served as the
basis for the cross-judgment was in existence at the time of the assign-
ment,12 or where the judgment debtor procured his judgment subsequently
to the assignment but prior to notice of that assignment.-3
In the instant case the cross-judgment arose after the assignment of
the first judgment. It is therefore difficult to see upon what ground set-off
was allowed since it does not appear that the facts bring the case within
any of the above mentioned situations. There is no indication that the
assignment was made fraudulently or that plaintiff obtained her cross-judg-
ment prior to notice of assignment. Nor does it seem that the claim upon
which plaintiff's cross-judgment is based existed at the time of the assign-
ment. If the court intended to rest the decision upon the defendant's
insolvency, it is peculiar that no mention is made of the time when it
occurred- It is true that the court regarded the case as controlled by
9 For a somewhat similar extension of set-off in the case of claims, see
Note (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 669.
20 Hobbs v. Duff, 23 Cal. 596 (1863); Morris v. Holis, 2 Harr. 4 (Del.
1835); Crecelius v. Bierman, 72 Mo. App. 355 (1897); Duncan v. Bloom-
stock, 2 McCord 313 (S. C. 1823) ; Trammell v. Chamberlain, 60 Tex. Civ.
App. 238, 128 S: W. 429 (1910); see Hovey v. Morrill, 61 N. H. 9, 13
(1881).
1 
'Tuscumbria, etc., R. R. Co. v. Rhodes, 8 Ala. 206 (1845); Coonan v.
Loewenthal, 147 Cal. 218 81 Pac. 527 (1905); Whitehead v. Jessup, 7 Colo.
App. 460, 43 Pac. 1042 .(1896); Hovey v. Morrill, 61 N. H. 9 (1881); cf.
Hurst v. Sheets & Trussell, 14 Iowa 322 (1862) ; Merrill v. Souther, 6 Dana
305 (Ky. 1838); Gay v. Gay, 10 Paige 369 (N. Y. 1843); see Sellers v.
Bryan, 17 N. C. 358, 359 1833).
12 Arp v. Blake, 63 Cal. App. 362, 218 Pac. 773 (1923); DeLaval Sepa-
rator Co. v. Sharpless, 134 Iowa 28, 111 N. W. 438 (1907); McIntosh v.
McIntosh, 211 Iowa 750, 234 N. W. 234 (1931); Clark v. Raison, 126 Ky.
486, 104 S. W. 342 (1907); New Haven Copper Co. v. Brown, 46 Me. 418
(1859); M Manus v. Cash & Luckel, 101 Tex. 261, 108 S. W. 800 (1908).
Contra: Ledyard v. Phillips, 58 Mich. 204, 24 N. W. 551 (1885); Holly v.
Cook, 70 Mliss. 590, 13 So. 228 (1893); McAdams v. Randolph, 42 N. J. L.
332 (1880) (judgment rather than claim); Roberts v. Carter, 38 N. Y. 107
(1868); Jaeger v. Koenig, 33 Misc. 82, 67 N. Y. Supp. 172 (1900); Anglo-
American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 112 Fed. 574 (S. D. N. Y.
1902) (citing the New York rule; with which cf. Wyckoff v. Williams,
infra note 13).
.3 Haskins v. Jordan, 123 Cal. 157, 55 Pac. 786 (1898); Wyckoff v. Wil-
liams, 136 App. Div. 495, 121 N. Y. Supp. 189 (1st Dep't 1910) ; Townsend
v. Quinan, 47 Tex. 1 (1877). Contra: Pheiffer v. Harris, 74 Ky. 400 (1875)
(with which cf. Clark v. Raison, supra note 12). In the following cases also
set-offs have been denied because the cross-judgment was not in existence
at the time of the assignment: Wyvell v. Barwise, 43 Blinn. 171, 45 N. W.
11 (1890); Walton v. Catron, 125 Mo. App. 501, 102 S. W. 1058 (1907);
Laubsch v. West New York Silk Mill Co., 57 N.J. L. 234, 30 Atl. 550
1894); Ramsey's Appeal, 2 Watts 228 (Pa. 1834); Hyde v. Gearhart, 44
S.D. 217, 183 N.W. 1,14 (1921).
-a Insolvency must have existed at the time of the assignment, or set-off
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certain statutory provisions.15 But it is difficult to see in what way those
provisions compelled the decision reached, for in phraseology and apparent
meaning, they are not dissimilar from those of other states which are
regarded' 6 as not having materially changed the doctrine of set-off, a
doctrine that existed and still exists independent of statute.17
CHANGES IN FORM OF BUSINESS UNIT WITHIN BULK SALES AcTs
THE bulk sales laws,' studied in their historical and commercial back-
ground,2 seem to provide a device supplementary to the common law
remedy against fraudulent conveyances. Creditors, prejudiced by unan-
nounced sales or transfers by retailers 3 of goods in bulk which themselves
often served as the basis of the credit extension, could only preserve their
rights by proving mutual fraudulent intent; 4 and proof of fraud was an
exceedingly difficult task. Bulk sales laws of two general types declare
these transactions either fraudulent and void or presumptive of fraud in the
absence of performance of certain acts calculated to give creditors notice
in time to protect themselves or to insure a fair sale.
A question as to the applicability of the bulk sales statutes arises when
there is a transfer by an individual or business unit to another individual
or business unit that continues the old concern through a different entity.
The Pennsylvania court has recently held that a transfer of assets by an
individual to a corporation formed by him is outside the application of
the State Act.5 In other cases involving transfers by individuals to corpo-
rations,6 partnerships to corporations,7 and corporation! to corporations,8
where the principal parties of both the old and new units remain sub-
stantially the same, a contrary result has been reached. A mere transmuta-
tion of the business with an apparent purpose of defeating creditor's claims
will be denied. Henderson v. McVay, 32 Ala. 471 (1858): Robbins v. Hol-
ley, 1 Mon. 191 (Ky. 1824) ; see supra note 11.
15 GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) §§ 5670, 5969.
16 Haskins v. Jordan, 123 Cal. 157, 55 Pac. 786 (1898) ; 2 Freeman Judg-
ments (5th ed. 1925) § 1142.
17 Haskins v. Jordan, supra note 16; Pierce v. Bent, 69 Me. 381 (1879);
Chase v. Woodward, 61 N. H. 79 (1881) ; 2 Freeman, toc. cit. supra note 16.
Both law and equity courts have this inherent power to set off cros's-
judgments. Hovey v. Morrill, 61 N. H. 9 (1881) ; Nuzum v. Morris, 25 W.
Va. 559 (1885).
'For list of statutes in various states see Billig, Bulk Sales Laws: A
Study In Economic Adjustment (1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 72, footnotes
3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
2 For a good account of the development of this type of legislation, see
Billig, supra note 1.
3 For a list of cases dealing with the practice these statutes were called
upon to meet, see Billig, supra note 1, footnote 18.
4 See 12 R. C. L. 533-536.
5McLean v. Miller Robinson Co., 55 F. (2d) 232 (E. D. Pa. 1931).
.P Kline v. Sims, 149 Miss. 154, 114 So. 871 (1927).
7 N. Sakelos & Co. v. Hutchinson Bros., 129 Md. 300, 99 Atl. 357 (1916).
8 First National Bank v. Raleigh Savings Bank & Trust Co., 37 P. (2d)
301 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930). There is some ground for believing that a trans-
fer of assets by an old corporation to the new corporation in reorganization
might come under the bulk sales acts. Cf. Reilly v. Allen-Spiegal Shoo
Manufacturing Co., 184 Wis. 257, 199 N. W. 216 (1924).
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clearly seems to come within the scope of both types of the statute0 When
the statute makes the transaction only presumptively fraudulent and void 20
it is possible to uphold a transfer by a partnership to a successor corpora-
tion by proving absence of actual fraud.1 But a conflict appears where the
act flatly makes the transaction fraudulent or void.- The language of
several cases Z indicates automatic application of the act without decision
as to the presence of active or intended fraud. In contradiction to this
policy, the Washington court 1 4 looked behind the act and refused to apply
it where the "reason" for its passage was not present; it determined that
the particular transfer of the individual to the corporation was not fraudu-
lent, inasmuch as there was an available remedy in a levy on the capital
stock of the corporation given in return for the goods. The absence of any
fraud in the recent Pennsylvania case 25 justifies the result in the light of
this policy. However, the decision may be less sound in its apparent em-
phasis upon the theory 16 that an exchange for capital stock does not con-
stitute a transfer for "cash or credit" within the statute, rather than upon
the actual presence of fraud in the particular situation. The Washington
court avoided the danger of this technical construction, declaring that any
manipulation of the stock so as to deprive the creditors of a remedy would
not be countenanced.17 Apparently the ends of justice will theoretically
be served by either automatic or deliberative application of the statute. The
correctness of either method seems to depend upon the "reason" for the
statute. If the act was aimed only at the fraudulent transactions, a deliber-
ative application is in order. But if the statute was intended as a reason-
'West Shore Furniture Co. v. Murphy, 141 N. Y. Supp. 835 (Sup. Ct.
1913) ; Kline v. Sims, supra note 6.
10 For a classification of statutes with discrimination of states having
this type, see Thorpe v. Pennock Mercantile Co., 99 Minn. 22, 10 N. W.
940 (1906).
1 Thorpe v. Pennock Mercantile Co., supra note 10; ef. Norton-Berger
Shoe Co. v. Rideau, 1 La. App. 244 (1924).
1- For list of states, see supra note 10.
'3 Smith-Calhoun Rubber Co. v. McGhee Rubber Co., 235 S. W. 321 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1921); N. Sakelos & Co. v. Hutchinson Bros., &upra note 7.
14 M askell v. Spokane Cycle & Auto Supply Co., 100 Wash. 16, 170 Pac.
350 (1918).
15 McLean v. Miller Robinson Co., supra note 5. The court decided that
there was no fraud. Actually the individual formed a corporation and
transferred his assets to it because he could thereby get a receiver appointed
for the corporation which would secure equal distribution of his assets
and defeat the objecting creditor who had wanted to get in his full claim
by -way of attachment. For the litigation dealing with this other angle, see
Shipiro v. Wilgus, 55 F. (2d) 234 (C. C. A. 3d, 1931). To have applied the
statute would have only made the corporation a receiver for the creditors
and would not have given the protesting creditor any preference. 69 P,&
STAT. (1919) § 521-523.
16 The Maskell ease, supra note 14, only mentions this construction of the
act, seeming to place its major emphasis on the purpose of the act in rela-
tion to the particular case. The McLean case, supra note 5, maies it the
main basis of decision, neglecting to emphasize the actual motives of the
debtor and results to the creditors.
7  Two other cases substantiate this reservation by holding the act applic-
able when the transfer by the old unit to the new corporation was followed
by a manipulation of the stock so as to defeat creditors. First National
Bank v. Raleigh Savings Bank & Trust Co., supra. note 8; West Shore Fur-
niture Co. v. Murphy, supra note 9.
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able exercise of police power applying to all such transfers because of the
abundant and exceptional opportunities for fraud, then an automatic appli-
cation is proper.
Turning to (1) sales by merchants to outsiders to form a partnership,
and (2) sales by partners to co-partners, slightly different considerations
appear. The first situation is generally placed within the act Is for varying
reasons. One consideration 19 is the possibility of economic prejudice to
the individual creditors of the seller, in that after the sale, they may have
rights against only one-half of the stock 20 instead of the whole. Even when
this objection has been obviated through contribution by the incoming
partner of an equivalent share of the goods to the new firm, the same re-
sult has been reached by stating that the transaction was "outside the
usual course of business." 21 Another court, assuming that the transfer by
a partner to a co-partner might be upheld,22 reasoned that non-application
to the first type would defeat the statute completely by allowing the indi-
vidual to sell one-half interest in his goods one day to form a partnership
and the other one-half interest to his partner the next. 23
In the case of a transfer by a partner to a co-partner,2 4 the majority
rule of non-aliplication of the statute is supported on the theories that the
statute is in derogation of the common law and tends to restrain liberty
of contract and therefore should be strictly construed; 25 that the act is
remedial and should be liberally construed but there is no physical delivery
nor change in actual or legal possession 20 as is contemplated by the act;
that there is no actual prejudice to creditors.27 The minority view 28 is
18 Daly v. Sumpter Drug Co., 127 Tenn. 412, 155 S. W. 167 (1913);
Marlow v. Ringer, 79 W. Va. 568, 91 S. E. 386 (1917); Va-Carolina Chemi-
cal Co. v. Bouchelle, 12 Ga. App. 661, 78 S. E. 51 (1913); Watkins v. An-
gus, 241 Mich. 690, 217 N. W. 894 (1928).
19 Daly v. Sumpter Drug Co., supra note 18.
20 After the partnership is formed the creditors of the individual seller
have a right only against his present interest in the partnership profits and
surplus on winding up, which, assuming he had sold one-half interest would
be only one-half of the goods, assuming no partnership debts. UNIFORM
PARTNERSHIP ACT, § 26. In the meantime the personal creditors of the
seller cannot levy against the partnership property. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP
ACT, § 25 (c). They may subject the debtor partner's interest to a charging
order against his share of the profits. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT, § 28 (1).
21 Marlow v. Ringer, supra note 18.
22 Va-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Bouchelle, supra note 18.
23 See Watkins v. Angus, supra note 18.
24 Note (1931) 5 UNIV. OF CINN. L. REV. 91; (1926) 75 U. OF PA. L. REy.
787; (1926) 11 MINN. L. REV. 668.
25 Taylor v. Folds, 2 Ga. App. 453, 58 S. E. 683 (1907) ; Fairfield Shoe
Co. v. Olds, 176 Ind. 526, 96 N. E. 592 (1911).
26 Schoeppel v. Pfannensteil, 122 Kan. 630, 253 Pac. 567 (1927). The
court based its theory on the idea that each partner had an interest in the
whole and that the sale of this interest was not a change in the purchasing
partner's actual ownership since he already owned an interest in the whole.
Conversely that the seller partner owned no property specifically and his
sale was only of an interest in the partnership and not any particular, stock
or bulk. No doubt its basis of reasoning is the corresponding theory in
partnership law. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT, § 25 (1) and (2) (a);
MECHEM, ELErENTS OF PARTNERSHIP (2d ed. 1920), § 146.
27 The court reasons that the partnership creditors are not prejudiced as
to the goods since they are physically and legally as accessible as before.
Personal creditors of the selling partner are not considered because they
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based on the argument that the interest of the partnership creditors will
be prejudiced since the stock of goods would be subject to levy and claim
by personal creditors of the purchasing partner after the transfer, whereas
prior to the transfer, the partnership creditors had to be paid before the
satisfaction of any personal creditors. - There is a prejudice to the per-
sonal creditors of the selling partner in that they lose their right to a
charging order on his interest - or to his share of the surplus on winding
up.=' There is doubt, however, as to whether the personal creditors of the
selling partner will be considered.= Any estimate of the relative merit of
these conflicting views involves a choice between a strict logical construc-
tion of the statute based upon the legal nature of a partner's interest and
a realistic decision grounded upon the possibility of economic prejudice to
the creditors. 33
ENTRAPmENT As DEFENSE IN PROSECUTION FOR PROHIBITION VIOLATION
BEFORE the advent of the National Prohibition Act the defense of entrap-
ment was normally available to a defendant who could show that he had
been incited and induced to violate the law by an agent of the government.'
The attitude of the federal courts in the early days of Prohibition toward
such conduct on the part of officers of the government is well shown in the
case of United States v. Echols 2 where, upon evidence of improper induce-
cannot look directly to the partnership goods. For an evaluation of these
views, see footnotes 29 and 30 infra.
2 Howell v. Howell, 142 Tenn. 31, 215 S. W. 278 (1919); In re Strobe],
43 F. (2d) 179 (W. D. Ark. 1930). In the latter case the claim of the
selling partner on notes given in payment was barred in bankruptcy because
the notes were given without complianc with the bulk sales act. If the
plaintiff's claim had been allowed, the claims of the partnership would be
reduced by the amount of the payments made to the partner who got out.
- The court does not go any farther in explaining this prejudice. Al-
though the compliance with the bulk sales law would not prevent this latter
prejudice, compliance with it would give the partnership creditors notice
of the sale beforehand instead of afterwards by the notice of the dissolution.
AIECHEMi, ELEAIENTS OF PARTNERSHIP (2d ed. 1920) § 364, § 391. This notice
beforehand would give the creditors additional opportunities to protect
themselves from any dangers to their standing that the change in the
partnership status might entail.3 D UNIFoaI PARTNERSHIP ACT, § 28.
31 UNIFoRm PARTNERSHIP ACT, § 26.
= Garner v. Thompson, 161 Wash. 317, 296 Pac. 1043 (1931). Statute
did not require in sale of a partnership that personal creditors of partners
be listed. This raises the problem as to whether they can be considered.
The objection of a personal creditor on bulk sales act was overruled in
The Peterson Co. v. Freeburn, 204 Iowa 644, 215 N. W. 74G (1927), because
the indirect nature of his claim against partnership interest, supra note 22,
refutes an argument that he advanced credit in strength of that interest.
3 The sale of an interest in an already existing partnership to an out-
sider, with the retirement of one partner, was exempted from the applica-
tion of the statute. Yancey v. Lamar-Bankin Drug Co., 140 Ga. 359,
78 S. E. 1078 (1913). The personal creditors are apparently the only ones
prejudiced in this transaction. The economic soundness of the decision
depends upon the determination as to whether they may be considered.
'Woo Wai v. United States, 223 Fed. 412 (C. C. A. 9th, 1915); Sam
Yick v. United States, 240 Fed. 60 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917).
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ment by the pgosecuting officer, the court refused to accept the defendant's
plea of guilty and dismissed the case. A great change from this attitude
is found in one circuit at least, after fourteen years of attempted enforce-
ment of the prohibition law, in the recent case of Sorrels v. United States a
where inducement and persuasion by the prohibition officer are wholly
denied as a defense. In this case the officer procured his introduction to the
defendant as a furniture dealer on vacation, "desirous of purchasing some
good whiskey." The defendant stated that he did not have any whiskey
and "did not fool with it." After a visit of an hour and a half, however,
during which it developed that the two had served together in the same
division of the army during the World War, and after repeated requests
for whiskey from his former comrade in arms, the defendant finally agreed
that he would "see if he could get some." After an absence of less than
half an hour he returned with whiskey which he sold to the officer. Upon
evidence to this effect, the court refused to submit the issue of entrapment
to the jury, holding that this defense may be pleaded only where, as a
result of the inducement, the accused is placed in the position of having
committed a crime which he did not intend to commit,4 or where the consent
implied in the inducement is such as to negative the offense.5
Although, obviously, an officer who purchases intoxicants from a boot-
legger thereby connives with him at his crime, it is nevertheless very gen-
erally agreed that mere consent on the part of the officer to the illegal sale
is no defense to the seller.6 Moreover, deliberate plans laid by prohibition
officers which merely afford an opportunity for suspected persons to violate
the law do not constitute entrapment which may be pleaded in defense.,
It has been repeatedly held, however, that while such opportunities may be
offered,8 and while officers themselves may offer to buyV they may not
persuade or induce violations of the law.10 Exceptions have been made, and
a certain amount of encouragement and persuasion allowed where complaint
has been lodged against the defendant,ll or where there was other reason
2 253 Fed. 862 (S. D. Tex. 1918).
2
,U. S. Daily, April 29, 1932, at 394 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932).
4E. g., cases of mistaken identity,, such as selling liquor illegally to In-
dians who had been disguised by government officials to conceal their
identity (when sales to others than Indians were legal). United States v.
Healy, 202 Fed. 349 (D. Mont., 1913); Voves v. United States, 249 Fed.
191 (C. C. A. 7th, 1918).
5 E. g., as in larceny or burglary. See United States v. Whittier, Fed. Cas,
No. 16,688 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1878).
Jordan v. United States, 2 F. (2d) 598 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924). See cases
cited infra notes 7, 8, and 9.
7 Smith v. United States, 284 Fed. 673 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922), cert. den.
261 U. S. 617, 43 Sup. Ct. 362 (1923); Zucker v. United States, 288 Fed.
12 (C. C. A. 3d, 1923) cert. den. 262 U. S. 756, 43 Sup. Ct. 703 (1923).
8 Ritter v. United States, 293 Fed. 187 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923) ; Swallum v,
United States, 39 P. (2d) 390 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930).
9 Farley v. United States, 269 Fed. 721 (C. C. A. 9th, 1921); Ritter v.
United States, supra note 8.
ao Billingsley v. United States, 274 Fed. 86 (C. C. A. 6th, 1921), cert. den.
257 U.-S. 656, 42 Sup. Ct. 168 (1921); Leon v. United States, 290 Fed. 384
(C. C. A. 9th, 1923), cert. den. Trueba v. United States, 263 U. S. 710, 44
Sup. Ct. 37 (1923)-; O'Brien v. United States,51 F. (2d) 674 (C. C. A. 7th,
1931); (1931) 45 HARv. L. REv. 381.
11 Fetters v. United States, 260 Fed. 142 (C. C. A. 9th, 1919), cert. den.
251 U. S. 554, 40 Sup. Ct. 119 (1919); Corcoran v. United States, 19 F.
(2d) 901, (C. C. A. 8th, 1927).
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for the officer to believe that the defendant was an habitual offender.12
Some persuasion has been permitted merely in way of giving reasons in
an offer to buy--for example, that the liquor was wanted for siclmess. 5
The generally accepted test of entrapment is the determination of whether
the defendant would have committed the offense at all, with the officer or
with anyone else, had he not been subjected to the particular solicitation
and persuasion by the officer; 14 and this is of course a matter of fact for
the jury. Though it has apparently not been so stated, the question here
seems to be, did the officer resort to more urgent persuasion than a bona
fide customer of a bootlegger would reasonably have done, due allowance
being made for natural caution in making an initial sale to a new customer.
The principle is apparently accepted that while the officer may play an
ignoble or unethical role in detecting crime,' 5 he may not incite and produce
crime -which would not otherwise have existed.'0 The principle case here
considered, by refusing to submit the issue of entrapment to the jury
upon evidence of- aggravated inducement, 7 appears to take the extreme
position of legalizing, so far as persuasion may be employed to that end,
the inciting and producing of crime by government officers for the purpose
of punishing it.
This decision is, of course, not binding upon other circuits, which continue
to be governed by rules of their own making, generally to the effect sug-
gested above.- s The Supreme Court has repeatedly denied certiorari on
entrapment cases,19 preferring, evidently, that each circuit make its own
rule. It has, however, in Olnstead v. United Statcs, 0 passed upon the larger
question of government approval of unethical conduct on the part of its
officers in criminal prosecutions. Overruling its former stand of disowning,
on behalf of the government, the products of illegality - or stealth 2- on
the part of its officers when prdented as evidence in criminal prosecutions,
12 United States v. Certain Quantities of Intoxicating Liquors, 290 Fed.
824 (D. N. H. 1923); Rossi v. United States 293 Fed. 896 (C. C. A. Sth,
1923); Swallum v. United States, sufra note 8.
13 Goldstein v. United States, 256 Fed. 813 (C. C. A. 7th, 1919).
1d Butts v. United States, .273 Fed. 35 (C. C. A. Sth, 1921); Newman v.
United States, 299 Fed. 128 (C. C. A. 4th, 1924). See infra note 16.
. 15 Olmstead v. United States, infra note 20; O'Brien v. United States,
supra note 10, where prohibition agents operated a "speak-easy" for the
purpose of selling liquor to policehien.
16 Butts v. United States, supra note 14; Luterman v. United States, 231
Fed. 374 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922) ; O'Brien v. 'United States, supra, note 10. See
United States v. Pappagoda, 288 Fed. 214 (D. Conn. 1923) for a very
thorough analysis of entrapment cases prior to that date.
- Where there is evidence of entrapment the issue of fact must be sub-
mitted to the jury. Jarl v. United States, 19 F. (2d) 891 (C. C. A. Sth,
1927).
18 Recent cases holding, contra to the principal case, that inducement by
government officers constitutes entrapment: Silk v. United States, 16 F.
(2d) 568 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Ybor v. United States, 31 F. (2d) 42
(C. C. A. 5th, 1929); Vaccaro v. Collier, 38 F. (2d) 862 (D. lMd. 1930);
O'Brien v. United States, supra note 10. Many other cases have so declared
the law since the enactment of the National Prohibition Act, including
Newman v. United States, supra note 14, decided in 1924 by the same court
which decided the principal case, and expressly overruled by the latter.
19 See supra notes 7, 10, and 11.
2o 277 U. S. 438, 48 Sup. Ct. 564 (1928).
21 Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341 (1914).
22Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261 (1921).
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it admitted by a vote of five to four evidence for the government obtained
by prohibition enforcement agents through wire-tapping, in violation of
the laws of the state where it occurred. The issue in that case between
greater facility in convicting criminals on the one hand and the loss of
respect for a government which comes into court with unclean hands on
the other, clearly set out in the four dissenting opinions, 23 is fundamentally
the issue here. To just what extent actual punishment deters crime, it can
probably never be known. There is, however, a persistent feeling prevalent,
today that a high and respectful regard for the probity and integrity of
the government itself, epitomized in standards set for it in its courts of
justice, is of no small importance in inducing obedience to its laws.2 4 In
the words of Holmes' dissent in the above cases: 25 "We have to choose,
and for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape
than that the Government should play an ignoble part." 20
POWER OF STATE BANKING COMMISSIONER TO PLEDGE ASSETS TO
RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE CORPORATION
IN the recent case of Riches v. Hadlockl, the Utah Banking Commissioner,
empowered by state statute, took possession of the insolvent Sugar Banking
Co., paid off certain obligations, and then applied to the district court for an
order directing him to pledge the assets of the bank to secure a two year loan
from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The purpose of the loan was
in harmony with the theory of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation,2
namely, to delay liquidation of abnormally deflated assets and at the same
time to pay dividends to depositors in order to relieve their immediate need,
The order was granted, but at the instance of a depositor-stockholder, the
Utah Supreme Court issued a writ of prohibition to the lower court on the
grounds that the power thus to pledge assets was not set out in the statute,
and that since the Banking Commissioner was a state officer deriving his
powers from the statute, the court had no jurisdiction to enlarge those
powers.
Statutes thus centralizing the control of state banks through the appoint-
ment of an administrative officer with variously defined duties and powers
exist in practically every state.3 The result is to bring a higher quality of
23 See particularly the dissenting opinions of Justices Brandeis and
Holmes.
24 See Arnold, The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal
Process (1932) 45 HARv. L. REV. 617, 640 et seq.
25 Supra note 20, at 470, 48 Sup. Ct. at 575.
26 That such "ignoble" activity on the part of the government may not
only violate the canons of public decency, but also lead to the conviction
of innocent persons through perjured testimony of criminals or degenerates
employed by the government as "stool pigeons," was clearly shown in the
recent vice squad investigations in New York. See People v. Tait, 255 N. Y.
Supp. 455 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1932); BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNO-
CENT: Icie Sands (1932) at 357.
1 U. S. Daily, May 7, 1932, at 450.
2 11 CONG. DIGEST 55 (Feb. 1932); First Quarterly Report of Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation, FED. RESERVE BULL., April, 1932, at 226.
3 Illustrative Statutes: ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) § 6306; FI,. CoMix.
LAws (1927). § 6102; GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) § 2366; Ky. STAT.
(Carroll, 1930) §§ 165a-15-16.
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technical training to small banks,4 and to avoid the expense of a separate
receiver for each bank. In no case, however, are the duties of receivership
completely taken over by the statutory officer. In some jurisdictions he
merely initiates the proceedings, leaving the remainder of the process to be
carried out by the court; 5 in others, he may carry to completion the liquida-
tion of the assets, subject to the possibility that for certain purposes, a
chancery receiver may be appointed.G
Clearly, the Utah statute falls into the latter group1 According to its
terms, the Banking Commissioner, upon one of nine contingencies (including
insolvency), may take possession of the bank's assets, perform certain mat-
ters of routine, liquidate the assets, and do all else necessary to preserve
the assets. The statute provides, however, for the appointment of a chancery
receiver "when necessary to preserve the assets." It is therefore possible
that the refusal of the court liberally to construe the statute resulted from
its reluctance to place such power over the assets of an insolvent bank in
the hands of a political officer. If so, the denial of the Commissioner's power
to pledge the assets of an insolvent bank to secure a loan from the Finance
Corporation may mean only that its exercise is restricted to court officers.
Again, the court may have been unwilling to construe the powers of the
bank commissioner to include borrowing on the assets of an insolvent bank,
because of the business policy that an insolvent bank ought not to encumber
its assets further, but should liquidate them as quickly as possible.8 The
basis for such a policy is the possibility of fraud and mismanagement in-
volved in dragging out the liquidation, and the likelihood that assets might
thereby become further impaired9 This same mistrust of delay in the closing
up of tottering concerns has been reflected in recent Supreme Court opinions
with reference to consent receiverships.1o It should be noted, however, that
even in cases which state the proposition that liquidation of an insolvent
concern should not be delayed, there is a tendency to relax the rule of cau-
tion and to permit the receiver to borrow on the assets in the presence of
special circumstances so long as the hypothecation is part of an ultimate
process of liquidation.1i The situation has been likened to the pledging of
assets by an insolvent quasi-public corporation to secure receivers? cer-
4 Spahr, Bank Failures in 'the United Statzs (Supp. 1932 22 AM. Ec. REv.
214.
5Illustrative statutes: N. H. PuB. LAws (1926) C. 268, § 4; N. Y.
CONSOL LAWS (Cahil, 1930 c. 3, § 10; TEX. STAT. (1928) § 342.
6 lllustrative statutes: MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 5323; Ky. STxT.
(Carroll, 1930) §§ 165a-15--16; WAsH. ComP. STAT. (Remington, Supp.
1927) §§ 3269, 3270; W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 8, § 30; KAN. Rmu.
STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 75 § 1301.
7 UTAH ComP. LAWS (1917) c. 23.
s 3 MICHIE, BANKS AND BANKING; In re Union Bank of Brooklyn, 96
Misc. 299, 161 N. Y. Supp. 29 (1916).
9 In re Union Bank of Brooklyn, supra note 8; Buchanan v. Hicks, 98
Ark. 370, 136 S. W. 177 (1911); Broussard v. Mason, 187 Mo. App. 281,
173 S. W. 698 (1915); Hooper v. Winston, 24 Ill. 353 (1860).
20 Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U. S. 36, 52, 54, 48 Sup. Ct. 208, 274, 275
(1927) ; Kingsport Press v. Brief English Systems, 54 F. (2d) 497, 499, 500
(1932) ; see People v. Michigan Trust Company, U. S. Daily, May 17, 1932,
at 517.
n The Bank of Montreal v. Chicago C. C. and W. Ry. Co., 48 Iowa 518
(1878) ; Heffron v. Rice, 149 Ill. 216, 36 N. E. 562 (1894) ; Cake v. Mohun
164 U. S. 311, (1896); Haines v. Buckeye Wheel Company 224 Fed. 289
(1915); Nichols Vigilante v. Old South Trust Company, 251 Mlass. 385, 14G
N. E. 670 (1925).
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tificates.12
The basis for the rule of no hypothecation hardly seems applicable to
the Sugar Banking Co. case: the delay is confined definitely to five years at
the end of which the Finance Corporation loan must be met; the depositors
are meanwhile relieved of immediate need because money so secured is
distributed among them; and the possibility for fraud and mismanagement
is minimized by the close scrutiny given by the Reconstruction agency to
each loan and its application. Moreover, the abnormally deflated market
would seem to be a circumstance justifying the allowance of hypothecation
until market conditions improve.
The implications of the decision become more apparent when it is realized
that over half the states have statutes sufficiently similar to those in Utah
to give rise to the problem of the present case.la If this case is followed,
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation as an emergency agency will en-
counter a formidable obstacle in the way of an important phase of its work.
121 TARDY'S SmITH ON RECEIVERS (2d ed. 1920) § 44.
13 Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,. California, Colorado, Georgia, Delaware,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada,
New Hampshire, North Dakota, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin.
